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Introduction
Quality adjusted life years (QALYs) are increasingly used as an outcome measure in health program evaluation. The measure is based on a procedure in which health states are assigned a value on a scale from unity (healthy) to zero (dead) and sometimes to a value below zero (worse than dead). Several multidimensional, non-disease-specific, scaling instruments are available that allow decision makers to look up values for any health state in which they might be interested. The values incorporated in these instruments have been elicited by means of various techniques, including the standard gamble, time trade-off, rating scales and magnitude estimation. The techniques give different results (for reviews, see ). The question inevitably arises: Which valuation technique, and which scaling instrument, is the most appropriate and how should this be judged?
Researchers engaged in developing health state scaling techniques have been hesitant to answer these questions (Rosser, 1983; Torrance, 1986; Williams, 1988) . This uncertainty at the theoretical level has permitted an arbitrary use of health state values in applied costutility analysis. In a review of 15 studies, found that 24 out of 36 valuations were based on the author's own judgement. Four valuations were obtained by applying an established scaling instrument, but in none of these cases was there an explanation of why the instrument was preferred to the other available instruments. None of the fifteen articles included a discussion of the health state values that could support them theoretically or make them seem plausible in terms of their implications for social choice. Similarly in the studies reported in Torrance's (1986) review, each of the four scaling techniques mentioned above was described as a method for measuring 'utility' although, as noted by Torrance, the relationship between the techniques is not well understood.
We believe that some of the uncertainty and arbitrariness in this field may be overcome. As a first step to achieve this, it is helpful to distinguish between two interpretations of the number of "QALYs gained" (Q):
1.
As a measure of production : Q = the increase in the amount of subjectively perceived well-life, i.e. the sum of increments to individual utilities.
2.
As a measure of social value : Q = the social value assigned to the program by the people from whom the health state values were elicited.
In the former case, the QALYs gained may be entered as an argument in a social welfare function which, in addition, includes ethical and other distributional considerations Mooney & Olsen, 1991; Wagstaff, 1991) . In the latter case, the number of QALYs gained is itself supposed to encapsulate considerations of distribution as well as efficiency.
In most of the cost-utility literature, QALY gains have been implicitly interpreted in the latter sense, i.e. as a measure of social value. This is clearly seen in the increasingly widespread practice of publishing cost-per-QALY league tables (Williams, 1985; Smith, 1990 ; O'Kelly & Westaby, 1990). Weinstein and Stason (1977) state the position explicitly: "Alternative programs or services are then ranked, from the lowest value to the highest, and selected from the top until available resources are exhausted". Williams (1987) puts it similarly: "The implications of such calculations seems to me to be that we should not expand treatment capacity where cost-per-QALY is high if there are untreated patients due to lack of capacity in technologies offering low-cost QALYs". It would be difficult to disagree with these statements if equity considerations were explicitly deemed to be irrelevant to decision making or if each of the projects under consideration had the same distributional implications. If either of these preconditions is met then there would be no distinction between the two interpretations of QALYs. However, with the special status attached to health in most countries it cannot simply be assumed that they are fulfilled. The authors arguing for the use of league tables do not appear to recognise the significance of these preconditions.
If QALYs gained are interpreted as measures of social value, the validity of the values obtained from different scaling techniques may be tested by asking whether the people from whom the values were elicited actually agree with the consequences in terms of the implied priorities for different health programs (Loomes & McKenzie, 1989; . This is a test of so called reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1971) .
One method for performing such a test is to look at the implications of scale values for the number of people receiving treatment of one kind that would be equivalent in value to one person receiving treatment of another kind, and to compare this number with people's directly elicited preferences for such a trade-off. In the literature the latter measurement technique is referred to as the equivalence of numbers procedure (Torrance, 1986 As noted by Mulley (1989) , there are surprisingly few tests of this kind published in the QALY literature. However, some data do exist. tested values elicited with the EuroQol rating scale in the way described above. In addition, the public reactions to the first priority list in Oregon (Hadorn, 1991) may be seen as an instance of health state scalings being subject to an informal, real world test of reflective equilibrium (Eddy, 1991; and proceed to comment on the three other scales in subsequent sections.
We emphasise that the paper concerns the use of the four instruments in question for assessing the social value of different health care programs, and hence to their role in allocating resources in the health sector. No judgement is made with respect to their validity as a measure of production or as a measure of the individual utility gains of different therapies. For a discussion of these issues, see Kind, 1990; Brooks, et al. 1991; . The instrument consists of a self administered questionnaire, in which subjects are asked to value health states on a visual analogue rating scale running from zero ("worst imaginable health state") to one hundred ("best imaginable health state"). In the first version of the instrument all states were described by six dimensions with two or three levels of functioning along each dimension (mobility (1/2/3), self care (1/2/3), major activity (1/2), leisure activity (1/2), pain (1/2/3), anxiety/depression (1/2)).
As noted above, carried out a formal test of reflective equilibrium by asking subjects to locate various health states on the EuroQol rating scale and then to make pairwise valuations of some of the health states. In each pair, the subjects were asked to nominate the number of cured patients in the less severe state that would be equivalent to curing one patient in the more severe state.
With both valuation techniques, analysis was carried out using median values, since, with the person trade-off technique, mean values may be unduly influenced by individuals responding with very high numbers which do not have real cardinal significance. The median may be interpreted simply as a measure of central tendency but also in terms of a majority view: If X is the median, then a majority are against assigning a lower value than X and also against assigning a higher value than X.
In six different subgroups, the median equivalence numbers were consistently much greater than those obtained by using the median rating scale scores as life year weights in the conventional QALY algorithm. Table 1 gives some examples.
Nord's study focused on programs which cured patients in various states of illness. There was no anchoring of the valuations to the value of life saving. The joint NorwegianAustralian study was constructed to rectify this omission. A self administered questionnaire was designed in which subjects were asked how they, as members of Parliament, would evaluate two proposed, equally costly, special units A and B. Unit A would save ten people per year from dying and give them full health. Unit B would cure a number of people in a state of chronic illness and return them to full health. The question put to the subjects was:
How many patients must be treated per year in unit B in order that you would find it just as valuable to spend the money on unit B as on unit A? Each subject was asked to evaluate one state of chronic illness in this way.
As a first step in both the Norwegian and the Australian study, two EuroQol states were used to describe states of chronic ill health (states A and B in table 2). As will be shown below, the results obtained for these two states in Norway were illogical, as the less severe state was given a lower median equivalence number than the more severe state. This may have been due to the complexity of the health state descriptions. An additional round of data collection with less complex descriptions (Z and W in table 2) was therefore conducted in both countries.
In Norway the subjects were partly a random population sample, selected by the Central Bureau of Statistics and partly a sample of the respondents to the preceding study . Altogether, 386 people were sent questionnaires. 109 were returned, representing a response rate 28.2 %. There were 102 useable answers.
In Australia a convenience sample of students and nurses was selected randomly from the personnel records of a university and a nearby hospital. In total 1442 people were sent a questionnaire and 384 useable answers were returned, representing a response rate of 27%.
The Australian study included a sub-experiment in which the presentation of the EuroQol states was varied in order to test for a possible framing effect. In half of the questionnaires, the lay out was as for states A and B in table 2. In the other half, the order of the items was changed, so that the positive items ("no problems") came first. The results were very much alike for both layouts. This is in accordance with a previous finding by Nord (1991) . Using a Mann-Whitney test it was not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the median values were the same from both questionnaires. Consequently, the data were pooled for the analysis reported here. Table 3 summarises the personal characteristics of the respondents. There is a moderate selection bias in favour of men and the well-educated in the Norwegian sample. In the Australian study, nurses gave a higher median equivalence number than students for state B, but a lower median than the students for state A. Neither difference was significant as judged by the Mann-Whitney test, and the data from the two groups were pooled.
In 28 cases in the Australian sample, zero was given as the equivalence number. Since it is difficult to see any meaning in such a response, these cases are excluded from the analysis below. 
Other instruments
The Quality of Well-Being Scale (QWB) was developed by Kaplan and colleagues at the University of California in San Diego (for a brief history, see [Kaplan & Anderson, 1988] ). It is based upon a rating scale extending from ten (well) to zero (dead) and a health state classification system consisting of three different dimensions of function and 25 symptom/-problem complexes. Community surveys have been conducted in which respondents were asked to use the rating scale to indicate the disutility of a single day with each kind of dysfunction and symptom. On the basis of these uni-dimensional disutility judgements, the value of any composite health state within the classification system can be determined on the standard 1-0 QALY-scale by means of a simple additive formula (see appendix). Each of the other states was scaled by asking a sample of 70 doctors, nurses, patients and others "how many times more ill" a patient in that state would be than a patient in the reference state. To clarify the meaning of the question, respondents were asked to imagine that their answer would define the proportion of resources that should be allocated to the relief of each health state.
The McMaster Health Classification System was developed by Torrance et al (1982). It has
four dimensions -physical function, role function, social-emotional function and health problem -each subdivided into a number of levels. Each level has a weight between unity and zero based on a combination of rating scale and time-trade off interviews in a community sample of healthy adults. Any health state may be scaled by entering weights for levels fitting that state into a multiplicative formula (see appendix).
To our knowledge, no person trade-off test has been carried out on states described by the descriptive system of the Quality of Well-Being Scale, the Rosser/Kind index or the McMaster Health Classification System. However, we have mapped the states included in our study (A, B, W and Z) into each of these instruments and subsequently scaled them (in the same way as we scaled states W and Z by means of the EuroQol instrument in the previous section).
The mapping is inevitably inexact, as each of the systems differ with respect to the dimensions used and the functional descriptions within each dimension. Some of the weights assigned to the health states by the three non-EuroQol instruments are therefore given as ranges. For details of the mapping, see appendix. Table 6 
Discussion
The article commenced by noting the distinction between the "production of well life" and "social value". In welfare economics, the latter would be measured by the "Social Welfare
Function" which would combine information about production, distribution and possibly considerations of "process" to determine the social desirability of different health programs.
In this framework resource allocation should be determined by social value and not by the value of production per se.
With some exceptions (Mooney & Olsen, 1991; Wagstaff, 1991) this distinction has been largely ignored in the cost utility literature and even when discussed it has been in theoretical terms. This is not surprising. Quantifying social value is conceptually hazardous as there is no agreement either about how it should be measured or about which ethical theory should form the basis for measurement. (Even this later statement presumes that societal judgements should be based upon a single theory.) There is an ethical system under which QALYs as a measure of production would correspond with social value as implicitly assumed in much of the literature. This system has been described by Mooney and Olsen (1991) as "Quasi -utilitarianism". Social welfare is equal to a weighted average of individually determined utilities where the weights ensure that each persons life year is equally important irrespective of the individuals personal characteristics or capacity to appreciate life years. The rule is almost certainly defective as it ignores distributional considerations and issues of entitlement which are known to be of importance in decision making, especially in the health sector (Harris, 1987; Nord, in press ).
In the present article we have employed one plausible device for eliciting social choice namely the person trade-off technique. Its present application does not permit all issues of process or equity to influence the calculation of social values as might occur in a more general Social Welfare Function, but it does permit a clear distinction to be made between the production of health and its social value, all else equal.
Our empirical data have obvious limitations. They were elicited from small samples of people (particularly for states W and Z in Norway), and the response rates were low. The results are therefore not necessarily representative of the Norwegian or Australian population at large, let alone populations in other countries. It is also a disturbing fact that in one of our sub-samples, we obtained a logically inconsistent equivalence number for state A. The data nevertheless form an interesting pattern in relation to the health state scaling instruments in question, and we feel that they must cause considerable concern about the use of several of the instruments for health program evaluation.
The lower end compression of states on the McMaster scale is remarkable, not only in relation to our person trade-off data, but also relative to the other three scaling instruments.
A closer look at the set of weights that the instrument uses makes this lower end As noted by Eddy (1991) , an important reason for this seems to be that the QWB assigned too low values to trivial states of illness. This again lead to low equivalence numbers for trivial treatments compared to treatments for severe conditions (for a further discussion, see .
While the QWB is clearly undervaluing less severe health states, the more serious states included in the present study were assigned values closer to the person trade-off scores.
We see two possible explanations of this. Firstly, there is a possible "anchoring" effect associated with the standard version of the QWB ). As noted above, the scale used to establish the standard set of disutility weights extended from ten to zero. The instructions included the following: "If you think the person's situation was about half-way between being dead and being completely well, then choose step 5". "Half-way between being dead and completely well" may have sounded like a very serious condition to many subjects (note the resemblance to "half dead"). This could have forced quite severe states into the upper half of the scale. The present study lends some support to this hypothesis.
Another important feature of the standard QWB is that its disutility weights express the undesirability of a single day in a particular state. As noted elsewhere The Rosser/Kind index has been criticised on the grounds that most health states are assigned values close to unity. Consequently, quality adjusted life years will not be very different from ordinary life years. QALYs will then add very little to decision makers' customary indicator of life expectancy (Mulkay, et al. 1987 ).
The present results lend some support to the view that this "upper end compression" is appropriate. It does not follow from this that Mulkay et al's (1987) Despite its limitations, the present study suggests that health state valuations provided by the other three well known instruments may need considerable adjustment before being appropriate for the calculation of QALYs, at least with the second interpretation of these discussed in this article, namely, as the measure of social value which is appropriate for decisions about the allocation of resources. See for instance (8) .
